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Abstract
In this paper we develop structural first passage models (AT1P and SBTV)
with time-varying volatility and characterized by high tractability, moving from
the original work of Brigo and Tarenghi (2004, 2005) [19] [20] and Brigo and
Morini (2006)[15]. The models can be calibrated exactly to credit spreads
using efficient closed-form formulas for default probabilities. Default events
are caused by the value of the firm assets hitting a safety threshold, which
depends on the financial situation of the company and on market conditions. In
AT1P this default barrier is deterministic. Instead SBTV assumes two possible
scenarios for the initial level of the default barrier, for taking into account
uncertainty on balance sheet information. While in [19] and [15] the models
are analyzed across Parmalat’s history, here we apply the models to exact
calibration of Lehman Credit Default Swap (CDS) data during the months
preceding default, as the crisis unfolds. The results we obtain with AT1P and
SBTV have reasonable economic interpretation, and are particularly realistic
when SBTV is considered. The pricing of counterparty risk in an Equity Return
Swap is a convenient application we consider, also to illustrate the interaction
of our credit models with equity models in hybrid products context.
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1 Introduction
Modeling firms default is an important issue, especially in recent times where the
crisis begun in 2007 has led to bankruptcy of several companies all over the world.
Structural models are based on the work by Merton (1974), in which a firm life is
linked to its ability to pay back its debt. Let us suppose that a firm issues a bond
to finance its activities and also that this bond has maturity T . At final time T ,
if the firm is not able to reimburse all the bondholders we can say that there has
been a default event. In this simplified context default may occur only at final time
T and is triggered by the value of the firm being below the debt level. In a more
realistic and sophisticated structural model (Black and Cox (BC) (1976), part of the
family of first passage time models) default can happen also before maturity T . In
first passage time models the default time is the first instant where the firm value
hits from above either a deterministic (possibly time varying) or a stochastic barrier,
ideally associated with safety covenants forcing the firm to early bankruptcy in case
of important credit deterioration. In this sense the firm value is seen as a generic asset
and these models use the same mathematics of barrier options pricing models. For a
summary of the literature on structural models, possibly with stochastic interest rates
and default barriers, we refer for example to Chapter 3 of Bielecki and Rutkowski
(2001). Here we just mention works generalizing the form of the default barrier to
account for the debt level, such as Briys and de Varenne (1997), Hsu et al. (2002),
Hui et al. (2003), and Dorfleitner, Schneider and Veza (2007).
It is important to notice that structural models make some implicit but important
assumptions: They assume that the firm value follows a random process similar to
the one used to describe generic stocks in equity markets, and that it is possible to
observe this value or to obtain it from equity information. Therefore, unlike intensity
models, here the default process can be completely monitored based on default free
market information and comes less as a surprise. However, structural models in their
basic formulations and with standard barriers (Merton, BC) have few parameters
in their dynamics and cannot be calibrated exactly to structured data such as CDS
quotes along different maturities.
In this paper we follow [19], [20], [15] and [16] to effectively use two families of
structural models (AT1P and SBTV) in the ideal “territory” of intensity models,
i.e. to describe default probabilities in a way that is rich enough to calibrate CDS
quotes. First of all, in Section 2 we present the Analytically Tractable First Passage
Model (AT1P), which has a deterministic default barrier and is a generalization of
the classic Black and Cox model; we show how this model, differently from the
Black and Cox Model, mantains analytical formulas for default probabilities even
when allowing asset volatility to be realistically time-varying. In Section 3 we show
how this feature can be exploited in order to calibrate the parameters of the model
to market prices of single name CDS’s (in a way similar to the procedure used to
calibrate intensities in reduced form models). While in [19] and [15] we had tested
AT1P and SBTV calibration on Parmalat data as Parmalat approached default,
here in Section 4 we consider the concrete case of another firm, Lehman Brothers,
approaching default, and we show how our proposed structural model calibration
changes as the company credit quality (as summarized by its CDS quotes) deteriorates
in time. The analysis of the model behaviour in representing Lehman approaching
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CVA One-sided Bilateral
Modelling Volatility Volatility and Correlation
IR Swaps Brigo Masetti (2005) Brigo Pallavicini (2007) Brigo, Pallavicini and
with Netting Papatheodorou (2009)
IR Exotics Brigo Pallavicini (2007) B., P. and P. (2009)
Oil Swaps Brigo Bakkar (2009)
CDS Brigo Chourdakis (2008) Brigo Capponi (2008)
Equity TRS Brigo Tarenghi (2004,2005)
Brigo Masetti (2005)
Table 1: Part of earlier analogous literature on CVA valuation with respect to inclu-
sion of underlying asset volatilities and/or correlation between underlying asset and
counterparties, along with bilateral features.
default leads us to introduce in Section 5 an extension of the model, aimed at adding
further realism to the model. This extension, called Scenario Barrier Time-Varying
Volatility Model (SBTV), assumes two possible scenarios for the initial level of the
default barrier, to take into account uncertainty on balance sheet information, and
in particular the difficulty in evaluating the liability portfolio of the company. Also
in this case we mantain analytical tractability and in Section 6 we present the results
of calibration to CDS quotes.
Due to their intrinsic nature, structural models result to be a natural method to
price equity-credit hybrid products and also to evaluate counterparty risk in equity
products. The counterparty risk (Credit Valuation) Adjustment (CVA) has received a
lot of attention in an exploding literature, and in several asset classes. We recall here
the work of Sorensen and Bollier (1994), Huge and Lando (1999), Brigo and Pallavicini
(2007), Brigo and Masetti (2005) and Brigo, Pallavicini and Papatheodorou (2009)
for CVA on interest rate products, both unilateral and bilateral (last paper). For
credit products, especially CDS, CVA has been analyzed in Leung and Kwok (2005),
Blanchet-Scalliet and Patras (2008), Brigo and Chourdakis (2009), Crepey, Jeanblanc
and Zargari (2009), Lipton and Sepp (2009), who resort to a structural model, and
Walker (2005), while Brigo and Capponi (2008) study the bilateral case. CVA on
commodities is analyzed in Brigo and Bakkar (2009), whereas CVA on Equity is
analyzed in Brigo and Tarenghi (2004, 2005). CVA with netting is examined in
Brigo and Masetti (2005), Brigo and Pallavicini (2007) and Brigo, Pallavicini and
Papatheodorou (2009). CVA with collateral margining is analyzed in Assefa, Bielecki,
Crepey and Jeanblanc (2009) and in Alavian et al (2009), whereas collateral triggers
are considered in Yi (2009). In Section 7 we consider the particular case of an Equity
Return Swap with counterparty risk. In this context we have to take care of the
correlation between the counterparty and the underlying, and this is done much more
conveniently in structural models than in intensity models. Here for CVA results in
equity payoffs we follow Brigo and Tarenghi (2004, 2005), also reported in the final
part of Brigo and Masetti (2005). To help the reader orientation with respect our
past works on CVA, we summarize them in Table 1. This is a table that is supposed
to help putting our paper in the context of our earlier works on CVA and is not meant
to be exhaustive or even representative of the research field.
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2 The Analytically Tractable First Passage (AT1P)
Model
The fundamental hypothesis of the model we resume here is that the underlying
process is a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), which is also the kind of process
commonly used for equity stocks in the Black Scholes model. This choice is the
typical choice of classical structural models (Merton, Black Cox), which postulate
a GBM (Black and Scholes) lognormal dynamics for the value of the firm V . This
lognormality assumption is considered to be acceptable. Crouhy et al (2000) report
that “this assumption [lognormal V] is quite robust and, according to KMVs own
empirical studies, actual data conform quite well to this hypothesis.”.
Proposition 2.1. (Analytically-Tractable First Passage (AT1P) Model) As-
sume the risk neutral dynamics for the value of the firm V is characterized by a risk
free rate rt, a payout ratio kt and an instantaneous volatility σt, according to equation
dVt = Vt (rt − kt) dt+ Vt σt dWt (1)
and assume a default barrier H(t) (depending on the parameters H and B) of the
form
H(t) = H exp
(∫ t
0
(
ru − ku − Bσ
2
u
)
du
)
and let τ be defined as the first time where V (t) hits H(t) from above, starting from
V0 > H,
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Vt ≤ H(t)}.
Then the survival probability is given analytically by
Q (τ > T ) =

Φ

 log V0H + 2B−12 ∫ T0 σ2udu√∫ T
0
σ2udu

− (H
V0
)2B−1
Φ

 log HV0 + 2B−12 ∫ T0 σ2udu√∫ T
0
σ2udu



 . (2)
For a proof, see [19] or [16].
A couple of remarks are in order. First of all, we notice that in the formula for
the survival probability in Proposition 2.1, H and V never appear alone, but always
in ratios like V/H ; this homogeneity property allows us to rescale the initial value
of the firm V0 = 1, and express the barrier parameter H as a fraction of it. In this
case we do not need to know the real value of the firm, neither its real debt situation.
Also, we can re-write the barrier as
H(t) =
H
V0
E0 [Vt] exp
(
−B
∫ t
0
σ2udu
)
.
Therefore the behaviour of H(t) has a simple economic interpretation. The backbone
of the default barrier at t is a proportion, controlled by the parameter H , of the
expected value of the company assets at t. H may depend on the level of liabilities,
on safety covenants and in general on the characteristics of the capital structure
of the company. This is in line with observations in Giesecke (2004), pointing out
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that some discrepancies between the Black and Cox Model and empirical regularities
may be addressed with the realistic assumption that, like the firm value, the total
debt grows at a positive rate, or that firms maintain some target leverage ratio as in
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).
Also, depending on the value of the parameter B, it is possible that this backbone
is modified by accounting for the volatility of the company’s assets. For example,
B > 0 corresponds to the interpretation that when volatility increases -which can
be independent of credit quality- the barrier is slightly lowered to cut some more
slack to the company before going bankrupt. In the following tests we simply assume
B = 0, corresponding to a case where the barrier does not depend on volatility and
the “distance to default” is simply modeled through the barrier parameter H .
3 Calibration of the structural model to CDS data
Since we are dealing with default probabilities of firms, it is straightforward to think
of financial instruments depending on these probabilities and whose final aim is to
protect against the default event. One of the most representative protection instru-
ments is the Credit Default Swap (CDS). CDS’s are contracts that have been designed
to offer protection against default. Here we introduce CDS in their traditional “run-
ning” form. For a methodology for converting running CDS to upfront CDS, as from
the so called “BIG BANG” by ISDA, see Beumee et al. (2009).
Consider two companies “A” (the protection buyer) and “B” (the protection
seller) who agree on the following. If a third reference company “C” (the refer-
ence credit) defaults at a time τC ∈ (Ta, Tb], “B” pays to “A” at time τ = τC itself
a certain “protection” cash amount LGD (Loss Given the Default of “C” ), supposed
to be deterministic in the present paper. This cash amount is a protection for “A” in
case “C” defaults. A typical stylized case occurs when “A” has bought a corporate
bond issued from “C” and is waiting for the coupons and final notional payment
from this bond: If “C” defaults before the corporate bond maturity, “A” does not
receive such payments. “A” then goes to “B” and buys some protection against this
risk, asking “B” a payment that roughly amounts to the bond notional in case “C”
defaults.
Typically LGD is equal to a notional amount, or to a notional amount minus a
recovery rate. We denote the recovery rate by “REC”.
In exchange for this protection, company “A” agrees to pay periodically to “B”
a fixed “running” amount R, called “CDS spread”, at a set of times {Ta+1, . . . , Tb},
αi = Ti−Ti−1, T0 = 0. These payments constitute the “premium leg” of the CDS (as
opposed to the LGD payment, which is termed the “protection leg”), and R is fixed in
advance at time 0; the premium payments go on up to default time τ if this occurs
before maturity Tb, or until maturity Tb if no default occurs.
“B” → protection LGD at default τC if Ta < τC ≤ Tb → “A”
“B” ← rate R at Ta+1, . . . , Tb or until default τC ← “A”
Formally, we may write the RCDS (“R” stands for running) discounted value at
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time t seen from “A” as
ΠRCDSa,b(t) := −D(t, τ)(τ − Tβ(τ)−1)R1{Ta<τ<Tb} −
b∑
i=a+1
D(t, Ti)αiR1{τ≥Ti}
+1{Ta<τ≤Tb}D(t, τ) LGD (3)
where t ∈ [Tβ(t)−1, Tβ(t)), i.e. Tβ(t) is the first date among the Ti’s that follows t, and
where αi is the year fraction between Ti−1 and Ti.
The pricing formula for this payoff depends on the assumptions on the interest
rates dynamics and on the default time τ . Let Ft denote the basic filtration without
default, typically representing the information flow of interest rates and possibly
other default-free market quantities (and also intensities in the case of reduced form
models), and Gt = Ft ∨ σ ({τ < u}, u ≤ t) the extended filtration including explicit
default information. In our current “structural model” framework with deterministic
default barrier the two sigma-algebras coincide by construction, i.e. Gt = Ft, because
here the default is completely driven by default-free market information. This is not
the case with intensity models, where the default is governed by an external random
variable and Ft is strictly included in Gt, i.e. Ft ⊂ Gt.
We denote by CDS(t, [Ta+1, . . . , Tb], Ta, Tb, R,LGD) the price at time t of the above
standard running CDS. At times some terms are omitted, such as for example the list
of payment dates [Ta+1, . . . , Tb]. In general we can compute the CDS price according
to risk-neutral valuation (see for example Bielecki and Rutkowski (2001)):
CDS(t, Ta, Tb, R,LGD) = E{ΠRCDSa,b(t)|Gt} = E{ΠRCDSa,b(t)|Ft} =: Et{ΠRCDSa,b(t)}
(4)
in our structural model setup. A CDS is quoted through its “fair” R, in that the rate
R that is quoted by the market at time t satisfies CDS(t, Ta, Tb, R,LGD) = 0. Let us
assume, for simplicity, deterministic interest rates; then we have
CDS(t, Ta, Tb, R,LGD) := −REt{P (t, τ)(τ − Tβ(τ)−1)1{Ta<τ<Tb}}
−
b∑
i=a+1
P (t, Ti)αiREt{1{τ≥Ti}}+ LGDEt{1{Ta<τ≤Tb}P (t, τ)}
= −R
[
b∑
i=a+1
(
P (t, Ti)αiQ{τ ≥ Ti}+
∫ Ti
Ti−1
(u− Ti−1)P (t, u)dQ(τ ≤ u)
)]
+LGD
∫ Tb
Ta
P (t, u)dQ(τ ≤ u) (5)
From our earlier definitions, straightforward computations lead to the price at
initial time 0 of a CDS, under deterministic interest rates, as
CDSa,b(0, R,LGD) = R
∫ Tb
Ta
P (0, t)(t− Tβ(t)−1)dQ(τ > t) (6)
−R
b∑
i=a+1
P (0, Ti)αiQ(τ ≥ Ti)− LGD
∫ Tb
Ta
P (0, t)dQ(τ > t)
so that if one has a formula for the curve of survival probabilities t 7→ Q(τ > t), as
in our AT1P structural model, one also has a formula for CDS. It is clear that the
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fair rate R strongly depends on the default probabilities. The idea is to use quoted
values of these fair R’s with different maturities to derive the default probabilities
assessed by the market.
Formula (2) can be used to fit the model parameters to market data. If we aim at
creating a one to one correspondence between volatility parameters and CDS quotes,
we can exogenously choose the value H and B, leaving all the unknown information
in the calibration of the volatility. If we do so, we find exactly one volatility param-
eter for each CDS maturity, including the first one. In our tests we have followed
this approach, where H has been chosen externally before calibration. In [19] and
[16] we also suggest a methodology that takes into account equity volatilities in the
calibration.
In general the above CDS calibration procedures are justified by the fact that
in the end we are not interested in estimating the real process of the firm value
underlying the contract, but only in reproducing risk neutral default probabilities
with a model that makes sense also economically. While it is important that the
underlying processes have an economic interpretation, we are not interested in sharply
estimating them or the capital structure of the firm, but rather we appreciate the
structural model interpretation as a tool for assessing the realism of the outputs
of calibrations, and as an instrument to check economic consequences and possible
diagnostics.
In the following section we analyze how the AT1P model works in practice, in
particular we consider the case of Lehman Brothers, one of the world major banks
that incurred into a deep crisis, ending up with the bank’s default. For simplicity our
tests have been performed using the approximated postponed payoff for CDS (see [16]
or Brigo and Mercurio (2006) for the details). An analysis of the same model on the
Parmalat crisis, terminating in the 2003 default, is available in Brigo and Tarenghi
(2004) and Brigo and Morini (2006).
4 A Case Study with AT1P: Lehman Brothers de-
fault history
• August 23, 2007: Lehman announces that it is going to shut one of its home
lending units (BNC Mortgage) and lay off 1,200 employees. The bank says it
would take a $52 million charge to third-quarter earnings.
• March 18, 2008: Lehman announces better than expected first-quarter results
(but profits have more than halved).
• June 9, 2008: Lehman confirms the booking of a $2.8 billion loss and an-
nounces plans to raise $6 billion in fresh capital by selling stock. Lehman
shares lose more than 9% in afternoon trade.
• June 12, 2008: Lehman shakes up its management; its chief operating officer
and president, and its chief financial officer are removed from their posts.
• August 28, 2008: Lehman prepares to lay off 1,500 people. The Lehman
executives have been knocking on doors all over the world seeking a capital
infusion.
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• September 9, 2008: Lehman shares fall 45%.
• September 14, 2008: Lehman files for bankruptcy protection and hurtles
toward liquidation after it failed to find a buyer.
Here we show how the AT1P model calibration behaves when the credit quality
of the considered company deteriorates in time (perceived as a widening of CDS
spreads1). We are going to analyze three different situations: i) a case of relatively
stable situation, before the beginning of the crisis, ii) a case in the mid of the crisis
and iii) a last case just before the default.
During our calibration we fix REC = 40%, B = 0 and H = 0.4; this last choice is
a completely arbitrary choice and has been suggested by the analogy with the CDS
recovery rate. Also, as a comparison, we report the results of the calibration obtained
using an intensity model. In simple intensity models, the survival probability can be
computed as Q (τ > t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λ(u)du
)
, where λ is the intensity function or
hazard rate (assumed here to be deterministic). We choose a piecewise constant
shape for λ(t) and calibrate it to CDS quotes.
4.1 Lehman Brothers CDS Calibration: July 10th, 2007
On the left part of Table 2 we report the values of the quoted CDS spreads on July
10th, 2007, before the beginning of the crisis. We see that the spreads are very low,
indicating a stable situation for Lehman. In the middle of Table 2 we have the results
of the calibration obtained using an intensity model, while on the right part of the
Table we have the results of the calibration obtained using the AT1P model.
It is important to stress the fact that the AT1P model is flexible enough to achieve
exact calibration.
Ti Ri (bps) λi (bps) Surv (Int) σi Surv (AT1P)
10 Jul 2007 100.0% 100.0%
1y 16 0.267% 99.7% 29.2% 99.7%
3y 29 0.601% 98.5% 14.0% 98.5%
5y 45 1.217% 96.2% 14.5% 96.1%
7y 50 1.096% 94.1% 12.0% 94.1%
10y 58 1.407% 90.2% 12.7% 90.2%
Table 2: Results of calibration for July 10th, 2007.
1It is market practice for CDS of names with deteriorating credit quality to quote an upfront
premium rather than a running spread. After the so called ISDA Big Bang, it is likely that several
names will quote an upfront on top of a fixed pre-specified running spread even when the credit
quality has not deteriorated. In our tests we directly deal with the equivalent running spread alone,
which can be obtained by upfront premia by means of standard techniques, see for example Beumee
et al. (2009).
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4.2 Lehman Brothers CDS Calibration: June 12th, 2008
In Table 3 we report the results of the calibration on June 12th, 2008, in the middle
of the crisis. We see that the CDS spreads Ri have increased with respect to the
previous case, but are not very high, indicating the fact that the market is aware of
the difficulties suffered by Lehman but thinks that it can come out of the crisis. The
survival probability resulting from calibration is lower than in the previous case; since
the barrier parameter H has not changed, this translates into higher volatilities.
Ti Ri (bps) λi (bps) Surv (Int) σi Surv (AT1P)
12 Jun 2008 100.0% 100.0%
1y 397 6.563% 93.6% 45.0% 93.5%
3y 315 4.440% 85.7% 21.9% 85.6%
5y 277 3.411% 80.0% 18.6% 79.9%
7y 258 3.207% 75.1% 18.1% 75.0%
10y 240 2.907% 68.8% 17.5% 68.7%
Table 3: Results of calibration for June 12th, 2008.
4.3 Lehman Brothers CDS Calibration: September 12th,
2008
In Table 4 we report the results of the calibration on September 12th, 2008, just
before Lehman’s default. We see that the spreads are now very high, corresponding
to lower survival probability and higher volatilities than before.
Ti Ri (bps) λi (bps) Surv (Int) σi Surv (AT1P)
12 Sep 2008 100.0% 100.0%
1y 1437 23.260% 79.2% 62.2% 78.4%
3y 902 9.248% 65.9% 30.8% 65.5%
5y 710 5.245% 59.3% 24.3% 59.1%
7y 636 5.947% 52.7% 26.9% 52.5%
10y 588 6.422% 43.4% 29.5% 43.4%
Table 4: Results of calibration for September 12th, 2008.
4.4 Comments
We have seen that the AT1P model can calibrate exactly CDS market quotes, and
the survival probabilities obtained are in accordance with those obtained using an
intensity model. This confirms the well known fact that, when interest rates are
assumed independent of default, survival probabilities can be implied from CDS in a
model-independent way (formula (6)). Anyway, after a deeper analysis of the results,
we find:
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- Scarce relevance of the barrier in calibration: the barrier parameter H has been
fixed before calibration and everything is left to the volatility calibration;
- High discrepancy between first volatility bucket and the following values.
The problem is that when the default boundary is deterministic, diffusion models
tend to calibrate a relevant probability of default by one-year (shortest horizon credit
spread) only by supposing particularly high one-year volatility. This is due to the fact
that, initially, with low volatilities the trajectories of a model like (1) do not widen fast
enough to hit a deterministic barrier frequently enough to generate relevant default
probabilities. One has therefore to choose a high initial volatility to achieve this. The
problem is also related to the fundamental assumption that the default threshold is
a deterministic, known function of time, based on reliable accounting data. This is
a very strong assumption and usually it is not true: balance sheet information is
not certain, possibly because the company is hiding information, or because a real
valuation of the firm assets is not easy (for example in case of derivative instruments).
Public investors, then, may have only a partial and coarse information about the true
value of the firm assets or the related liability-dependent firm condition that would
trigger default.
In AT1P model, H is the ratio between the initial level of the default barrier and
the initial value of the company assets. To take market uncertainty into account in
a realistic albeit simple manner, H can be replaced by a random variable assuming
different values in different scenarios. This is the main idea which leads us to introduce
the SBTV model.
5 SBTV Model (Brigo and Morini, 2006)
Where may one consider explicitly market uncertainty on the situation of the com-
pany, due to the fact that balance sheet information is not always reliable or easy
to value? This is a possibility in case the company is hiding information, or in case
illiquidity causes the valuation of the firm assets and liabilities to be uncertain. In
the first case, following for example Giesecke (2004) who refers to scandals such as
Enron, Tyco and WorldCom, a crucial aspect in market uncertainty is that public
investors have only a partial and coarse information about the true value of the firm
assets or the related liability-dependent firm condition that would trigger default.
This was our motivation to introduce randomness in H when we dealt with Parmalat
in [20] and [15]. In particular, randomness in the initial level H of the barrier was
used in [15] to represent the uncertainty of market operators on the real financial
situation of Parmalat, due to lack of transparency and actual fraud in Parmalat’s
accounting. Here it can represent equally well the uncertainty of market operators
on the real financial situation of Lehman. But in this case the uncertainty is related
to an objective difficulty in assigning a fair value to a large part of the assets and
liabilities of Lehman (illiquid mortgage-related portfolio credit derivatives) and to the
intrinsic complexity of the links between the bank and the related SIVs and conduits.
Therefore, in order to take market uncertainty into account in a realistic, albeit
simple, manner, in the followingH is replaced by a random variable assuming different
values in different scenarios, each scenario with a different probability.
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As in Brigo and Morini (2006)[15], in this work we deem scenarios on the barrier to
be an efficient representation of the uncertainty on the balance sheet of a company,
while deterministic time-varying volatility can be required for precise and efficient
calibration of CDS quotes. The resulting model is called Scenario Barrier Time-
Varying Volatility AT1P Model (SBTV). In this way we can achieve exact calibration
to all market quotes. Let the assets value V risk neutral dynamics be given by (1).
The default time τ is again the first time where V hits the barrier from above, but
now we have a scenario barrier
HI(t) = HI exp
(∫ t
0
(ru − ku − Bσ
2
u)du
)
=
HI
V0
E [Vt] exp
(
−B
∫ t
0
σ2udu
)
where HI assumes scenarios H1, H2,..., HN with Q probabilities p1, p2,..., pN . All
probabilities are in [0, 1] and add up to one, and HI is independent of W . Thus
now the ratio HI/V0 depends on the scenario I. If we are to price a default-sensitive
discounted payoff Π, by iterated expectation we have
E [Π] = E
[
E
[
Π|HI
]]
=
N∑
i=1
pi E
[
Π|HI = H i
]
so that the price of a security is a weighted average of the prices of the security in the
different scenarios, with weights equal to the probabilities of the different scenarios.
For CDS, the price with the SBTV model is
SBTVCDSa,b =
N∑
i=1
pi ·AT1PCDSa,b(H
i) (7)
where AT1PCDSa,b(H
i) is the CDS price computed according to the AT1P survival
probability formula (2) when H = H i. Hence, the SBTV model acts like a mixture
of AT1P scenarios.
6 A Case Study with SBTV: Lehman Brothers de-
fault history
Here we want to show how the SBTV model calibration behaves with respect to the
AT1P model. We consider the Lehman Brothers example as before. We limit our
analysis to only two barrier scenarios (H1 with probability p1 and H2 with probability
p2 = 1− p1), since, according to our experience, further scenarios do not increase the
calibration power.
In the calibration, we set the lower barrier parameter H1 = 0.4. If we consider
M CDS quotes, we have M + 2 unknown parameters: H2, p1 (p2 = 1 − p1) and all
the volatilities σj corresponding to the M buckets. It is clear that a direct fit like in
the AT1P case (where we have one unknown volatility σj for each CDS quote Rj) is
not possible. Exact calibration could be achieved using a two steps approach:
1 : We limit our attention to the first three CDS quotes, and set σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = σ¯.
Now we have three quotes for three unknowns (H2, p1 and σ¯) and can run a
best-fit on these parameters (not exact calibration, since the model could not
be flexible enough to attain it).
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2 : At this point we go back to consider all theM CDS quotes and, using H2 and
the p’s just obtained, we can run a second step calibration on theM volatilities
σj to get an exact fit. Notice that if the first step calibration is good enough,
then the refinement to σ1,2,3 due to second step calibration is negligible.
6.1 Lehman Brothers CDS Calibration: July 10th, 2007
In Table 5 we report the values of the calibrated barrier parameters with their cor-
responding probabilities, while in Table 6 we show the results of the calibration.
Scenario H p
1 0.4000 96.2%
2 0.7313 3.8%
Table 5: Scenario barriers and probabilities.
Tj Rj (bps) σj (bps) Surv (SBTV) σj Surv (AT1P)
10 Jul 2007 100.0% 100.0%
1y 16 16.6% 99.7% 29.2% 99.7%
3y 29 16.6% 98.5% 14.0% 98.5%
5y 45 16.6% 96.1% 14.5% 96.1%
7y 50 12.6% 94.1% 12.0% 94.1%
10y 58 12.9% 90.2% 12.7% 90.2%
Table 6: Results of calibration for July 10th, 2007.
Looking at the results in Tables 5 and 6 we see that, in the case of the quite
stable situation for Lehman, we have a lower barrier scenario (better credit quality)
with very high probability, and a higher barrier scenario (lower credit quality) with
low probability. Also, when comparing the results with the AT1P calibration, we see
that now the calibrated volatility is nearly constant on all maturity buckets, which
is a desirable feature for the firm value dynamics.
6.2 Lehman Brothers CDS Calibration: June 12th, 2008
Scenario H p
1 0.4000 74.6%
2 0.7971 25.4%
Table 7: Scenario barriers and probabilities.
Looking at the results in Tables 7 and 8 we see that the (worse credit quality)
barrier parameter H2 has both a higher value (higher proximity to default) and a
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Tj Rj (bps) σj (bps) Surv (SBTV) σj Surv (AT1P)
12 Jun 2008 100.0% 100.0%
1y 397 18.7% 93.6% 45.0% 93.5%
3y 315 18.7% 85.7% 21.9% 85.6%
5y 277 18.7% 80.1% 18.6% 79.9%
7y 258 17.4% 75.1% 18.1% 75.0%
10y 240 16.4% 68.8% 17.5% 68.7%
Table 8: Results of calibration for June 12th, 2008.
much higher probability with respect to the calibration case of July 10th, 2007. This
is due to the higher CDS spread values. Moreover, by noticing that the fitted volatility
has not increased too much, we can argue that the worsened credit quality can be
reflected into a higher probability of being in the scenario with higher default barrier
(worsened credit quality).
6.3 Lehman Brothers CDS Calibration: September 12th,
2008
Here we have a large increase in CDS spreads, which can be explained by a very
large probability of 50% for the higher barrier scenario and a higher value for the
scenario itself, that moves to 0.84 from the preceding cases of 0.79 and 0.73. Tables
9 and 10 show the results of calibration. We see that there are not greater differences
in volatilities than before, and the larger default probability can be explained by a
higher level of proximity to default and high probability of being in that proximity
(high H scenario). In this particular case we have equal probability of being either
in the risky or in the stable scenario.
Scenario H p
1 0.4000 50.0%
2 0.8427 50.0%
Table 9: Scenario barriers and probabilities.
Tj Rj (bps) σj (bps) Surv (SBTV) σj Surv (AT1P)
12 Sep 2008 100.0% 100.0%
1y 1437 19.6% 79.3% 62.2% 78.4%
3y 902 19.6% 66.2% 30.8% 65.5%
5y 710 19.6% 59.6% 24.3% 59.1%
7y 636 21.8% 52.9% 26.9% 52.5%
10y 588 23.7% 43.6% 29.5% 43.4%
Table 10: Results of calibration for September 12th, 2008.
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6.4 Comments
We have seen that the calibration performed with the SBTV model is comparable, in
terms of survival probabilities, with the calibration obtained using the AT1P model.
Also, the calibration is exact in both cases. However, we have seen that the SBTV
model returns a more stable volatility term structure, and also has a more robust
economic interpretation.
One of the main drawbacks of structural models is that they usually are not able
to explain short term credit spreads; in fact, usually the diffusion part of the GBM is
not enough to explain a non null default probability in very small time intervals. The
introduction of default barrier scenarios could be a way to overcome this problem; in
fact, a very high scenario barrier could be enough to account for short term default
probabilities.
At this point, a natural extension of the family of structural models we have
presented here is the valuation of hybrid equity/credit products. In the following
part of this paper, we are going to deal with this application.
7 A fundamental example: Pricing Counterparty
Risk in Equity Return Swaps
In this section we present an example of pricing with the calibrated structural model.
This follows Brigo and Tarenghi (2004), and is reported also in the last part of Brigo
and Masetti (2005). This example concerns the valuation of an equity return swap
where we take into account counterparty risk, and is chosen to highlight one case
where the calibrated structural model may be preferable to a reduced-form intensity
model calibrated to the same market information. This is an illustration of a more
general situation that typically occurs when one tries to price the counterparty risk
in an equity payoff. We will see that it is possible to split the expectation of the
payoff, and that the decomposition roughly involves the valuation of the same payoff
without counterparty risk and the valuation of an option on the residual NPV of the
considered payoff at the default time of the counterparty. Therefore including the
counterparty risk adds an optionality level to the payoff.
Let us consider an equity return swap payoff. Assume we are a company “A”
entering a contract with company “B”, our counterparty. The reference underlying
equity is company “C”. We assume “A” to be default-free, i.e. we consider unilateral
counterparty risk. For a discussion on unilateral vs bilateral risk, see Brigo and
Capponi (2008) and Brigo, Pallavicini and Papathodorou (2009). The contract, in
its prototypical form, is built as follows. Companies “A” and “B” agree on a certain
amount K of stocks of a reference entity “C” (with price S) to be taken as nominal
(N = K S0). The contract starts in Ta = 0 and has final maturity Tb = T . At t = 0
there is no exchange of cash (alternatively, we can think that “B” delivers to “A” an
amount K of “C” stock and receives a cash amount equal to KS0). At intermediate
times “A” pays to “B” the dividend flows of the stocks (if any) in exchange for a
periodic rate (for example a semi-annual LIBOR or EURIBOR rate L) plus a spread
X . At final maturity T = Tb, “A” pays KST to “B” (or gives back the amount K of
stocks) and receives a payment KS0. This can be summarized as in (8).
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Initial Time 0: NO FLOWS, or (8)
A −→ KS0 cash −→ B
←− K equity ←−
....
Time Ti : −→ equity dividends −→
A ←− Libor + Spread ←− B
....
Final Time Tb : −→ K equity or KSTb cash −→
A ←− KS0 cash ←− B
The price of this product can be derived using risk neutral valuation, and the
(fair) spread is chosen in order to obtain a contract whose value at inception is zero.
We ignore default of the underlying “C”, thus assuming it has a much stronger credit
quality than the counterparty “B”. This can be the case for example when “C” is an
equity index (Pignatelli (2004)). It can be proved that if we do not consider default
risk for “B”, the fair spread is identically equal to zero. But when taking into account
counterparty default risk in the valuation the fair spread is no longer zero. In case
an early default of the counterparty “B” occurs, the following happens. Let us call
τ = τB the default instant. Before τ everything is as before, but if τ ≤ T , the net
present value (NPV) of the position at time τ is computed. If this NPV is negative
for us, i.e. for “A”, then its opposite is completely paid to “B” by us at time τ itself.
On the contrary, if it is positive for “A”, it is not received completely but only a
recovery fraction REC of that NPV is received by us. It is clear that to us (“A”) the
counterparty risk is a problem when the NPV is large and positive, since in case “B”
defaults we receive only a fraction of it.
Analytically, the risk neutral expectation of the discounted payoff is (L(S, T ) is
the simply compounded rate at time S for maturity T ):
ΠES(0) = E0
{
1{τ>Tb}
[
−K NPV0−Tbdividends(0) +KS0
b∑
i=1
D(0, Ti)αi
(
L(Ti−1, Ti)
+X
)
+D(0, Tb)
(
KS0 −KSTb
)]
+1{τ≤Tb}
[
−K NPV0−τdividends(0) +KS0
β(τ)−1∑
i=1
D(0, Ti)αi
(
L(Ti−1, Ti)
+X
)
+D(0, τ)
(
REC(NPV(τ))+ − (−NPV(τ))+
)]}
(9)
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where
NPV(τ) = Eτ
{
−K NPVτ−Tbdividends(τ) +KS0
b∑
i=β(τ)
D(τ, Ti)αi (L(Ti−1, Ti) +X)
+ (KS0 −KSTb)D (τ, Tb)
}
. (10)
We denote by NPVs−tdividends(u) the net present value of the dividend flows between s
and t computed in u.
We state the following2:
Proposition 7.1. (Equity Return Swap price under Counterparty Risk).
The fair price of the Equity Swap defined above, i.e. (9), can be simplified as follows:
ΠES(0) = KS0X
b∑
i=1
αiP (0, Ti)− LGDE0
{
1{τ≤Tb}P (0, τ)(NPV(τ))
+
}
. (11)
The first term is the equity swap price in a default-free world, whereas the second one
is the optional price component due to counterparty risk.
If we try and find the above price by computing the expectation through a Monte
Carlo simulation, we have to simulate both the behavior of the equity “C” underlying
the swap, which we call St = S
C
t , and the default of the counterparty “B”. In
particular we need to know exactly τ = τB. Obviously the correlation between “B”
and “C” could have a relevant impact on the contract value. Here the structural
model can be helpful: Suppose to calibrate the underlying process V to CDS’s for
name “B”, finding the appropriate default barrier and volatilities according to the
procedure outlined earlier in this paper with the AT1P or SBTV model. We could set
a correlation between the processes V Bt for “B” and St for “C”, derived for example
through historical estimation directly based on equity returns, and simulate the joint
evolution of [V Bt , St]. As a proxy of the correlation between these two quantities we
may consider the correlation between SBt and S
C
t , i.e. between equities.
Going back to our equity swap, now it is possible to run the Monte Carlo simu-
lation, looking for the spread X that makes the contract fair. The simulation itself
is simpler when taking into account the following computation included in the dis-
counted NPV:
P (τ, Tb)Eτ
{
STb
}
= Sτ −NPV
τ−Tb
dividends(τ) (12)
so that we have
P (0, τ)NPV(τ) = KS0
b∑
i=β(τ)
P (0, Ti)αi(L(Ti−1, Ti) +X) +KS0P (0, Tb)
−KP (0, τ)Sτ =
= KS0
b∑
i=β(τ)
P (0, Ti)αiX +KS0P (0, Tβ(τ)−1)
−KP (0, τ)Sτ . (13)
2A proof of the proposition is given in the most general setup in Brigo and Masetti (2005).
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Ti R
BID
i (bps) R
ASK
i (bps)
1y 25 31
3y 34 39
5y 42 47
7y 46 51
10y 50 55
Table 11: CDS spreads used for the counterparty “B” credit quality in the valuation of
the equity return swap.
The reformulation of the original expected payoff (9) as in (11) presents an im-
portant advantage in terms of numerical simulation. In fact in (9) we have a global
expectation, hence we have to simulate the exact payoff for each path. In (11), with
many simplifications, we have isolated a part of the expected payoff out of the main
expectation. This isolated part has an expected value that we have been able to
calculate, so that it does not have to be simulated. Simulating only the residual part
is helpful because now the variance of the part of the payoff that has been computed
analytically is no longer affecting the standard error of our Monte Carlo simulation.
The standard error is indeed much lower when simulating (11) instead of (9). The
expected value we computed analytically above involves terms in STb which would
add a lot of variance to the final payoff. In (11) the only STb term left is in the
optional NPV part.
We performed some simulations under different assumptions on the correlation
between “B” and “C”. We considered five cases: ρ = −1, ρ = −0.2, ρ = 0, ρ = 0.5
and ρ = 1. In Table 12 we present the results of the simulation. For counterparty
“B” we used the CDS rates reported in Table 11. For the reference stock “C” we used
a hypothetical stock with initial price S0 = 20, volatility σ = 20% and constant div-
idend yield q = 0.80%. The simulation date is September 16th, 2009. The contract
has maturity T = 5y and the settlement of the LIBOR rate has a semi-annual fre-
quency. Finally, we included a recovery rate REC = 40%. Since the reference number
of stocks K is just a constant multiplying the whole payoff, without losing generality
we set it equal to one.
In order to reduce the errors of the simulations, we adopted a variance reduction
technique using the default indicator (whose expected value is the known default
probability) as a control variate. In particular we have used the default indicator
1{τ<T} at the maturity T of the contract, which has a large correlation with the final
payoff. Even so, a large number of scenarios are needed to obtain errors with a lower
order of magnitude than X .
We notice that X increases together with ρ. This fact can be explained in the
following way. Let us consider the case of positive correlation between “B” and “C”:
This means that, in general, if the firm value for “B” increases, moving away from
the default barrier, also the stock price for “C” tends to increase due to the positive
correlation. Both processes will then have high values. Instead, again under positive
correlation, if V Bt lowers towards the default barrier, also S
C
t will tend to do so, going
possibly below the initial value S0. In this case NPV (τ) has a large probability to be
positive (see (13)), so that one needs a large X to balance it, as is clear when looking
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at the final payoff (11). On the contrary, for negative correlation, the same reasoning
can be applied, but now if V Bt lowers and tends to the default barrier, in general
SCt will tend to move in the opposite direction and the corresponding NPV (τ) will
probably be negative, or, if positive, not very large. Hence the “balancing” spread
X we need will be quite small.
ρ X (AT1P) X (SBTV)
-1 0.0 0.0
-0.2 3.0 3.6
0 5.5 5.5
0.5 14.7 11.4
1 24.9 17.9
Table 12: Fair spread X (in basis points) of the Equity Return Swap in five different
correlation cases for AT1P and SBTV models.
Also we notice that, for ρ 6= 0, the fair spread X is different when computed
either with the AT1P or the SBTV model. This can be explained by the fact that
the payoff depends strongly on the dependence structure between τ and ST , while ρ
is an instantaneous correlation that ignores randomness in the barrier that defines
τ ; because of the different volatility term structure obtained with the two models,
but especially because of the random barrier in the SBTV model, we have that the
same value of ρ corresponds to different dependence structures between τ and ST ,
and hence to different values for the fair spread X . This shows that counterparty
risk pricing is quite subject to “model risk”, since two models calibrated to the same
data give different answers.
Finally, as a comparison, we computed X also with a calibrated intensity model,
and obtained X = 5.5 bps, a value consistent with the case ρ = 0, representing the
independence case.
8 Conclusions
In general the link between default probabilities and credit spreads is best described
by intensity models. The credit spread to be added to the risk free rate represents
a good measure of a bond credit risk for example. Yet, intensity models present
some drawbacks: They do not link the default event to the economy but rather to
an exogenous jump process whose jump component remains unexplained from an
economic point of view.
In this paper we introduced two analytically tractable structural models (AT1P
and SBTV) that allow for a solution to the above points. In these models the default
has an economic cause, in that it is caused by the value of the firm hitting the safety
barrier value, and all quantities are basic market observables. The extension to
hybrid equity/credit products turns out to be natural, given the possibility to model
dependency between equity assets and firms asset just by modelling the correlation
between the two dynamics.
We showed how to calibrate the AT1P and SBTV model parameters to actual
market data: Starting from CDS quotes, we calibrated the value of the firm volatilities
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that are consistent with CDS quotes and also leading to analytical tractability. We
also explained the analogies with barrier option pricing, in particular the case with
time dependent parameters.
As a practical example, we also applied the model to a concrete case, showing
how it can describe the proximity of default when time changes and the market
quotes for the CDS’s reflect increasing credit deterioration. When the market detects
a company crisis, it responds with high CDS quotes and this translates into high
default probabilities, i.e. high probabilities for the underlying process to hit the
safety barrier, that in turn translate in high calibrated volatilities for the firm value
dynamics.
Also, we showed how these two models can be used in practice: we analyzed the
case of an equity return swap, evaluating the cost embedded in the instrument due
to counterparty risk.
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